Asymmetric Price Transmission: A Case Study of the French Hake Value Chain by Jaffry, Shabbar
511
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 19, pp. 511–523 0738-1360/00 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved Copyright © 2005 Marine Resources Foundation
Asymmetric Price Transmission:
A Case Study of the French Hake Value Chain
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Abstract  Asymmetry in price transmission has recently attracted much atten-
tion in the food literature, but hitherto this important issue has been overlooked
in fish and fish product market studies. This paper seeks to fill this gap, and
thus takes the fisheries market literature closer to the general food literature. To
this end, an asymmetric error correction price transmission model has been es-
timated for the whole fresh French hake value chain. This paper tests for
cointegration between auction and retail prices using the Engle and Granger
two-step method, and the Enders and Granger Threshold Autoregression (TAR)
and Momentum Autoregression (M-TAR) methodologies. The results present
clear evidence of asymmetric price transmission in the whole hake value chain
and that the assumption of symmetric adjustment in this sector produces mis-
leading and biased results. The price response behaviour of retailers is found to
be consistent with asymmetric price transmission: retailers immediately respond
to positive changes in auction prices by adjusting their prices upward, but they
do not react as quickly to falling auction prices. These findings have profound
implications for studying margins along the value chain of fish and fish prod-
ucts. By ignoring the asymmetry in price transmission at different levels of the
value chain, calculations of margins will be biased.
Key words  Asymmetry, value chain, price transmission, Threshold Autoregression
(TAR), and Momentum Autoregression (M-TAR).
JEL Classification Code  Q22.
Introduction
In the literature on food markets, it has been widely recognised that a study of de-
mand and supply at one level of the value chain provides useful information for
policymakers. However, it is also argued that a good understanding of the margins
along the whole value chain would provide a fuller picture of supply and demand
forces and their interactions. It has also been recognised that responses of different
economic agents to markets forces may not necessarily be symmetric, implying that
changes in the raw material or product prices at the ‘upstream’ level (auction) may
exhibit different responses at the ‘downstream’ level (e.g., retail level) and vice
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versa. For instance, many consumers complain that retail petrol prices rise more
quickly when crude oil prices are rising than they fall when crude oil prices are fall-
ing (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert 1997).
Intuitively, this means that cost increases are completely and rapidly passed on
to the consumer, while there is a slower and less complete transmission of cost sav-
ings. A number of competing theories have been put forward to explain the existence
of asymmetric farm-retail price transmission in the food sector. Common explana-
tions of this phenomenon include: market power, search costs, consumer response to
changing prices, producer adjustment cost, and the behaviour of markups over the
business cycle. Using the case study of hake in France, this paper tests for the pres-
ence of asymmetry in price transmission between producer and retail prices.
Subsequently, the error correction models that take into account this asymmetry
have also been estimated, and provide the direction as well as the magnitudes of this
asymmetric price transmission.
Here, we describe some requirements to work with time series data, followed by
a discussion of an alternative procedure suggested by Enders and Granger (1998).
These issues highlight the usefulness of the approach adopted in the paper. With
time series data, it is essential that the time series properties of the data are tested
using the unit root test before estimating the price transmission at different levels of
the value chain. The modelling process then starts by estimating the long-run rela-
tionship between these series. If the residuals from the long-run relationship are
stationary, then according to Engle and Granger (EG) (1987), the two series are
cointegrated. Furthermore, according to EG, this enables us to specify the error cor-
rection model, which incorporates the long-run as well as short-run relationship
between the two series. However, this two-step EG methodology assumes a priori a
linear-symmetric adjustment in the transmission of changes in the upstream (auc-
tion) prices to changes in the downstream (retail) prices. A shock to producer prices
of a given magnitude would elicit the same response in retail prices, regardless of
whether the shock reflected a price increase or price decrease.
Enders and Granger (1998) considered an alternative error correction specifica-
tion called threshold autoregressive (TAR) model. This model recognises the fact
that a shock may have to reach a critical level before a significant response is
evoked. In this specification, a linear-asymmetric adjustment in the price transmis-
sion is modelled. An increase or decrease in producer prices of a given magnitude
would elicit a different quantitative response in retail prices. When the adjustment is
asymmetric, such that the series exhibit more ‘momentum’ in one direction than the
other, the methodology is termed as Momentum-Threshold Autoregression Models
(M-TAR). The TAR model can capture asymmetrically ‘deep’ movements in a se-
ries, while the M-TAR model is particularly useful in capturing the possibility of
asymmetrically sharp or ‘steep’ movements in a series.
One other important issue in the study of price transmission along the value
chain is the amount of value added to the product. If the value added is very high
due to packaging, or substantial processing is involved, then these factors have to be
taken into account in the methodology. The whole fresh hake chain involves very
little processing. Because of this, our results are robust.
In this paper, simple error correction mechanism (ECM), TAR, and M-TAR
specifications have been tested. The final error correction model of price transmis-
sion from upstream (auction) to downstream (retail level) has been estimated using
the M-TAR methodology. For retail prices, adjustments to positive and negative
shocks to the marketing margins are statistically significant. It is found that hake re-
tail prices at the supermarkets level respond strongly to negative shocks in auction
prices, but positive shocks in hake auction prices are allowed to persist at retail level
prices. Auction prices, however, only seem to respond to the positive shocks at theAsymmetric Price Transmission: French Hake Value Chain 513
retail level. These findings have profound implications for the study of margins
along the value chain and supply chain of fish and fish products. If one does not
take into account the asymmetry in price transmission at different levels of the value
chain, then calculations of margins along this chain will be biased.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides the de-
scription of price transmission, and recent advances in the methods for testing
asymmetry are highlighted. This is followed by a description of the implications of
this methodology for testing asymmetries in price transmission. The next section in-
troduces the fresh whole hake value chain in France, which is the case study used in
this paper. Empirical findings are presented in the next section of simple EG, TAR,
and M-TAR methodologies. The following section provides the results of asymmet-
ric and symmetric price transmission error correction models for fresh whole hake
in France. The final section summarises the conclusions of the study.
Asymmetric Price Transmission
Price transmission has widely been studied in the food marketing sector. However, a
major shortcoming of some earlier studies (Houck 1977; Boyd and Brorsen 1988;
Hahn 1990) is that they fail to take into account the possibility of the presence of an
equilibrium relationship between any price series being examined (von Cramon-
Taubadel and Loy 1997). Retail and producer prices may drift apart in the short run,
but in the long run, economic forces bring them together (Palaskas 1995; Enders
1995).
Balke and Fombe (1997) point out that the presence of fixed costs of adjustment
may prevent economic agents from adjusting continuously. Only when deviation
from equilibrium exceeds a critical threshold do the benefits of adjustment exceed
the costs and cause economic agents act to move the system back towards the equi-
librium.
Due to the above reasons, the threshold models of dynamic economic equilib-
rium have gained increased attraction in the analysis of price transmission
asymmetries (e.g., Azzam 1999). Most recent studies of price transmission (e.g.,
Abdulai 2002) have followed the methodology of Enders and Granger (1998). They
consider the time series properties of the variables, but do not presuppose a linear-
symmetric adjustment to study the transmission of producer price changes to
changes in retail prices in the Swiss pork market. This paper uses the same method-
ology for the fresh whole hake value chain in France over the period May 1989 to
December 1999. To date, asymmetric price transmission has received little attention
in the fisheries sector.
Econometrics Methodology
Potentially, the log of auction price (pa) and the log of retail price (pr) are
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Assuming that the prices (pa) and (pr) are both I(1), then EG (1987) show that
cointegration exists if ut ~ I(0). Residuals from equation (1) are used to estimate the
following relationship:Jaffry 514
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Rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration implies that the residuals in
equation (1) are stationary (r ¹ 0).
According to Enders and Siklos (1998), equation (1) can be viewed as an
attractor with its pull strictly proportional to the absolute value of ut. According to
the EG (1987) theorem, if r ¹ 0, equations (1) and (2) jointly imply the existence of
an error correction model that can be represented as:
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Equation (3) implies that if ut is above its equilibrium value (0), the adjustment is
equal to l, and if ut is below its long-run equilibrium, the adjustment is still equal to
l. This implies that the adjustment is symmetric.
Enders and Granger (1998) consider an alternative error correction specification
























A necessary condition for {ut} to be stationary is: –2 < (r1, r1) < 0. The adjustment
process is then formally expressed as:
DuI u I u tt t t t t =+ - + -- rr e 11 21 1 () , (5)






















where 0 represents a critical threshold. Models using equations (5) and (6) are
termed as TAR models. If ut-1 is above its equilibrium value (0), the adjustment is
r1ut-1, and if ut-1 is below its long-run equilibrium, the adjustment is r2ut-1.
The error correction model incorporating the threshold adjustments can then be
represented as:
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Enders and Granger (1998) show that when adjustment is asymmetric and the series
exhibits more ‘momentum’ in one direction than the other, replacing equation (6) by
























This is termed the Momentum-Threshold Autoregression Model (M-TAR).Asymmetric Price Transmission: French Hake Value Chain 515
The Case Study
Hake is an important whitefish in Europe. The majority of locally caught hake in
Europe is mainly consumed in fresh form in France and other parts of Europe. This
makes fresh hake a good case study. Recent declines in hake stocks have resulted in
lower production. The demand for imported hake, which normally comes in frozen
form, is very low. French consumers have not yet developed the taste for frozen
hake. However, this may change over time.
Figure 1 shows fluctuations in hake prices at the auction (Lauwhfr—log of
whole auction hake prices) and retail (Lsmwhfr—log of whole supermarket hake
prices) market levels. Increases at the auction level are always followed by even
bigger increases at the retail level. However, price reductions at the auction level are
not necessarily followed by reductions of the same magnitude at the retail level.
The above discussion can easily be understood when two series are plotted in
first differences form in figure 2 below.
This apparent asymmetry shown in the figures has very important implications
for the hake market in France. Low catches due to low stocks are resulting in a
steady increase in whole hake prices at auction level, which are then transmitted to
consumers. If asymmetric price transmission is present, then consumers may not
benefit from price reductions which will tend not be fully passed on to them. Hake
fisheries management has to take this asymmetry into account, and good cost benefit
analysis of management actions will be required comparing the cost of enforcement
of the policy of stock improvement and marginal benefits of reduced prices to the
consumer. This means that a bioeconomic solution to the problem of stock depletion
in hake fisheries is required in contrast to exclusively supply side measures of effort
control.
Figure 1.  Log of Auction and Retail Whole Hake Prices in France
Lsmwhfr = Log of supermarket retail prices of whole hake in France.
Lauwhfr = Log of auction retail prices of whole hake in France.Jaffry 516
Asymmetry Tests
Table 1 shows Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test results and they indicate that
whole hake auction and retail prices have a unit root (i.e., non-stationary). Table 2
shows the results of cointegration tests using the EG (1987) methodology and
Enders and Granger (1998) TAR and MTAR methodologies. Using equation (2), the
EG (1987) test indicates that the two price series are cointegrated. The null of no
cointegration is rejected at the 1% level of significance.
Using Enders and Granger’s (1998) TAR methodology, the cointegration test
also shows that the two price series are cointegrated, and the null of no cointegration
(r1 = r2 = 0) is rejected using the F test at the 1% level of significance. The M-TAR
model also confirms that the two price series are cointegrated, and the null of no
cointegration (r1 = r2 = 0) is rejected at the 1% level of significance.
The asymmetry hypothesis is tested using TAR and M-TAR methodologies.
Both methods show that the null of symmetry (r1 = r2) is rejected using the F test at
the 5% level of significance. These results confirm that there are asymmetrically
‘deep’ as well as ‘sharp’ or ‘steep’ movements in the prices series, and the adjust-
ment process between these prices at the auction and retail levels, due to positive
and negative shocks at the upstream level, is also asymmetric.
In equation (6), the value zero represents the critical threshold. If ut-1 is above
its equilibrium value (0), the adjustment is equal to r1ut-1, but if ut-1 is below its
long-run equilibrium, the adjustment is equal to r2ut-1. Enders and Granger (1998)
termed this “the asymmetric adjustment process.”
Figure 2.  First Difference of Auction and Retail Whole Hake Prices
DLsmwhfr = First difference of log of supermarket retail prices of whole hake in France.
DLauwhfr = First difference of log of auction retail prices of whole hake in France.Asymmetric Price Transmission: French Hake Value Chain 517
Figure 3 clearly shows this asymmetry. When the auction and retail prices of
whole hake are modelled, adjustment to negative shocks on the auction prices
(uplus—errors above zero showing slow adjustment) and positive shocks to the auc-
tion prices (unminus—errors below zero showing fast adjustment) are asymmetric.
The cointegration results allow us to model these series in error correction form.
The null of cointegration was not rejected using either of the methodologies. Be-
cause of this, we have estimated retail and auction price error correction models.
These models provide us with the magnitudes of the asymmetric responses (see
table 2). The results clearly show that both shocks do not result in similar responses
( ￿r1uplus  and  ￿r2uminus ) and do not reach the equilibrium level (steady-state, long-
run equilibrium state between auction and retail whole hake prices) at the same
speed ( ￿￿ ). rr 21 uminus uplus <
Table 1
Stationarity Tests
ADF~ INTERCEPT ADF~TREND & INT.
Critical Values: Critical Values:
1%: –3.4804 1%: –3.4808
5%: –2.8834 5%: –3.8836








1st DIFF. ADF –8.419763** –8.429876**
** = Reject the null of unit root at the 1% level (i.e., series are I(1)).
Table 2
Estimates of Speed of Adjustment Parameters in the French Whole Hake Price
Transmission Models
Engle-Granger Threshold Momentum-Threshold
(equation 3) (equation 7) (based upon equation 8)
r1 –0.3431 (–4.329) –0.4107 (2.705)1 –0.3582 (–3.144)1
r2 NA –0.2879(–2.181)1 –0.2549 (–2.125)1
r1 = r2 = 0 NA 9.4501 (0.0002)2 6.73 (0.0017)2
r1 = r2 NA 4.7554 (0.031)2 4.5177 (0.0356)2
Notes: 1 Values in the parentheses are t values. 2 Values in parentheses are estimated probability values;
outside parentheses are the F statistic values.Jaffry 518
Estimates of Price Transmission
Asymmetric Error Correction Models
Retail Price Model
Table 3 shows the estimated asymmetric error correction model results of whole
hake retail monthly prices from June 1989 to December 1999.1 The results show that
for retail prices, adjustments to positive and negative shocks to the marketing mar-
gin are statistically significant and retail prices respond strongly to negative shocks.
However, positive shocks are allowed to persist.
These results imply that whole hake retail prices adjust to correct long-run dis-
equilibria in retail and auction whole hake prices. Other things being equal, the
speed of adjustment indicates that adjustment is immediate in the whole hake retail
sector, where only 23.9% of the disequilibria are removed each month when the
shock is negative, and 35% disequilibria is removed each month when there is a
positive shock in auction prices. These results show that retailers immediately re-
spond to changes in auction prices by adjusting their prices. This means that there is
asymmetric price transmission in the whole hake market.
A number of possible economic interpretations are provided in the literature of
the asymmetric price transmission in the product value chains. The auction (input)
market is highly competitive with many suppliers, none of whom have any market
power. Consequently they are compelled to take the price determined by changing mar-
ket conditions—in both directions. Conversely the retail (output) market is characterised
by a smaller number of firms, each of which possesses market power against its custom-
ers. Consequently, they do not need to immediately reduce their price when cost
conditions improve. They must do so in the long run of course, or their competitors will
undercut them, but the market does not require immediate downward adjustment. In-
stead, they can temporarily increase their profit margins. However, with cost
increases, they will quickly adjust retail prices in order to preserve profit margins.
The other possible economic explanation of this asymmetry is the menu costs in
a market with generally increasing prices. Being more charitable to the supermarket
there are costs (menu costs) in making changes to marked prices. If a firm is consid-
ering a price change in light of cost changes, they would want to weigh the costs of
these adjustments and compare them with any losses resulting from being tempo-
rarily out of equilibrium. If the evidence is that prices are generally moving upwards,
this means that firms will be less inclined to lower prices, as these lower prices are
likely to be only temporary at an equilibrium level. Quite soon if costs are rising, then
the price will have to go up again. On the other hand, a price increase is likely to be in
the same direction as the long-run trend, even if it temporarily exceeds that trend.
To understand this asymmetric price adjustment in the hake market, it is vital to
be aware of the dynamics of the hake market in France. The demand for hake grew
from 30,000t Live Weight Equivalent (lwe) (apparent consumption) in 1975 to
90,000 t lwe (apparent consumption) in the early 1990s and fell to 60,000 t lwe in
1998 (LeGrel, Corre, and Tuncel 1998). According to LeGrel, Corre, and Tuncel, the
market for hake in France is relatively small, with a mean market share of only 3.2%
in value between 1982 and 1995. Current estimates show that roughly 40% of total
hake consumption in France is made up of whole fresh hake, with the remainder
composed mainly of frozen products (Hartmann, Jaffry, and Asche 2000). Domestic
producers supply the bulk of fresh hake in France, which is mainly sold through
1 Lag length 2 was selected on the basis of Akaike’s information criteria (AIC).Asymmetric Price Transmission: French Hake Value Chain 519
auction markets. Earlier findings show that all auction markets belong to a single
area of price setting (Perez Agundez 2001).
These dynamics in the hake market explain asymmetric price responses at the
retail level to the price changes at the auction level. Hake has only a very small
share of this market and is also a perishable product; consequently, if the prices rise
beyond some threshold due to presence of the fixed costs of adjustment, this may
prevent French retailers from adjusting quickly to price changes. They may then
turn to other species if price increases persist. As Ball and Mankiw (1994) and
Balke and Fombe (1997) explain, only when deviation from the equilibrium exceeds
a critical threshold do the benefits of adjustment exceed the costs, and hence, eco-
nomic agents act to move the system back toward equilibrium. The above results of
threshold models of dynamic economic equilibrium between auction and retail hake
prices have provided useful insights into the price transmission asymmetries.
Table 5 presents the diagnostics tests. The model has high R2 = 0.6 and the
model passed all the regression evaluation tests including the F-tests for the hypoth-
esis that the i-period lag (Fk = i) is zero. We find that there was no serial correlation
present (Far, against 2nd order autoregression), and there was no autoregressive con-
ditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH, against 1st order). There was no hetero-
skedasticity (Fhet), and lastly, a c2-test for normality shows no non-normality in the
errors. There was no evidence of model misspecification on the basis of these evalu-
ation tests. These tests are given below. Plots associated with the adequacy of this
model (based on recursive estimation statistics, namely one-step residuals and one-step
ahead Chow tests)2 were also examined, with no evidence of parameter instability.
Figure 3.  TAR Graphs
ECM = errors from the long-run equation.
uplus = positive errors MTAR term from equation (8).
uminus = negative errors MTAR term from equation (8).
2 These tests also show that there were no structural breaks in the equations relating the variables.Jaffry 520
Auction Price Model
Table 3 shows the estimated asymmetric error correction model results of whole
hake monthly auction prices from June 1989 to December 1999. The results show
auction prices only seem to respond to the positive shocks in the retail prices (de-
mand increases).
Other things being equal, the speed of adjustment indicates that the adjustment
in the auction price is quite fast, with 51.6% of the disequilibrium being removed
each month. They show that fishermen respond positively to the higher retail prices.
Table 5 presents the diagnostics tests. The model has an R2 = 0.44. The model
does not pass all the regression evaluation tests. The F-tests for the hypothesis that
the i-period lag (Fk = i) is zero is not rejected. We find that there was some serial
correlation present (Far, against 2nd order autoregression), but there was no
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH, against 1st order). There was
no heteroskedasticity (Fhet), and lastly, a c2-test for normality shows no non-nor-
mality in the errors. There was some evidence of model misspecification on the
basis of these evaluation tests. These tests are given below. Plots associated with the
adequacy of this model (based on recursive estimation statistics, namely one-step re-
siduals and one-step ahead Chow tests)3 were also examined, with some evidence of
parameter instability being evident.
Table 3
Asymmetric Error Correction Model Estimates for Whole Hake in France
Retail Price Equation Auction Price Equation
Dependent Variable Dlsmt Dlaut
Estimated Estimated
VARIABLE Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
Dlsmt–1 –0.261 –2.806** 0.078 0.436
Dlsmt–2 –0.033 –0.429 0.064 0.444
Dlsmt 1.140 8.444**
Dlaut 0.328 8.410**
Dlaut–1 0.198 3.600** –0.141 –1.306
Dlaut–2 0.010 0.179 –0.116 –1.126
uplust–1 –0.239 –1.824* –0.516 –2.123**
uminust–1 –0.352 –2.983** –0.105 –0.461
Constant 0.003 0.333 –0.011 –0.688
Notes:
** significant at the 1% level; * significant at the 5% level.
Dlsm = First difference of log of supermarket retail prices of whole hake in France.
Dlau = First difference of log of auction retail prices of whole hake in France.
uplus_1 = positive errors MTAR term from equation (8).
uminus_1 = negative errors MTAR term from equation (8).
3 These tests also show that there were no structural breaks in the equations relating the variables.Asymmetric Price Transmission: French Hake Value Chain 521
Table 4
Symmetric Error Correction Model Estimates for Whole Hake in France
Retail Price Equation Auction Price Equation
Dependent Variable Dlsmt Dlaut
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
VARIABLE Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Dlsmt–1 –0.262 –2.817** 0.077 0.430
Dlsmt–2 –0.035 –0.455 0.068 0.472
Dlsmt 1.162 8.672**
Dlaut 0.332 8.737**
Dlaut–1 0.198 3.600** –0.144 –1.333
Dlaut–2 0.013 0.236 –0.107 –1.039
ECMt–1 –0.300 –4.000** –0.300 –2.055**
Constant 0.0007 0.140 –0.003 –0.300
Notes:
**significant at the 1% level; *significant at the 5% level.
Dlsm = First difference of log of supermarket retail prices of whole hake in France.
Dlau = First difference of log of auction retail prices of whole hake in France.
Symmetric Error Correction Models
For comparison purposes, we also present symmetric error correction model results
for auction and retail whole hake monthly prices from June 1989 to December 1999
in table 4.
These results show that whole hake retail and auction prices adjust to correct
long-run disequilibria in retail and auction whole hake prices. Other things being
equal, the speed of adjustment indicates that adjustment is similar in the whole hake
retail and auction prices, where only 30% of the disequilibria is removed each
month. This is much higher than the retail equation and very low compared to above
50% in the auction equation. This shows that assuming symmetric response pro-
duces misleading and biased results.
Due to asymmetric adjustments, it is incorrect to examine the short-run dynam-
ics with a symmetric error correction model. According to Enders and Granger
(1998), a symmetric error correction model would not reveal differential adjust-
ments of the positive and negative changes. The diagnostics tests of symmetric
models show similar results to the asymmetric models (table 5).
Conclusions
The responses of different economic agents to market forces may not necessarily be
symmetric, implying that changes in the raw material or product prices at the up-
stream level (production) may exhibit different responses at the ‘downstream’ level
(e.g., retail level) and vice versa. This paper tests the presence of asymmetry in
price transmission between producer and retail prices of whole hake in France. Sub-
sequently, the error correction models that take into account this asymmetry have
also been estimated and provide the direction as well as the magnitude of this asym-
metric price transmission.Jaffry 522
For retail hake prices, adjustments to positive and negative shocks to the mar-
keting margin are found to be statistically significant, and retail prices respond
strongly to negative shocks. However, positive shocks are allowed to persist. Auc-
tion prices only seem to respond to positive shocks. This implies that whole hake
retail prices adjust to correct the disequilibria in retail and auction whole hake
prices. However, auction prices only respond to positive disequilibria.
Other things being equal, the speed of adjustment indicates that the response is
slow in the whole hake retail sector, where some 23.9% of the disequilibria is re-
moved each month. However, the adjustment in the auction price is quite fast, where
some 52% of the disequilibria is removed each month. This adjustment is possibly
due to the perishable nature of the product. These results show that retailers immedi-
ately respond to changes in auction prices by adjusting their prices due to hake’s
small share in the French market. They also show that fishermen respond positively
to higher retail prices.
Overall, this paper shows that there is asymmetric price transmission in the
whole hake market, and to assume that adjustment is symmetric is likely to produce
misleading and biased results. Due to asymmetric adjustments in the hake fisheries,
it is incorrect to examine the short-run dynamics using a symmetric error correction
model. According to Enders and Granger (1998), a symmetric error correction
model would not reveal differential adjustments of the positive and negative
changes.
These findings have clear implications for studying margins along the value
chain of fish and fish products. By ignoring the asymmetry in price transmission at
different levels of the value chain, the calculation of margins will be biased.
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